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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
ELWOOD HUTCHESON'
In his annual address to the American Law Institute on May
9, 1935, Chief Justice Hughes in these words well stated the ob-
jective:
"It is manifest that the goal we seek is a simplified
practice which will strip procedure of unnecessary forms,
technicalities and distinctions, and permit the advance of
causes to the decision of their merits within a minimum
of procedural encumbrances. It is also apparent that in
seeking that end we should not be fettered by being com-
pelled to maintain the historic separation of the proced-
ural systems of law and equity .... In the improvement
we contemplate in the federal system we shall have the
advantage of the simplicity and flexibility made possible
by the exercise on the part of the Court of its rule-making
power. '
The manifest desirability of that objective of course cannot be
questioned.2 It is indeed a "consummation devoutly to be wished."
That that objective has been ably attained is now apparent from
examination of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' which
on December 20, 1937 were adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States.4  On January 3, 1938 the Attorney General sub-
mitted the same to Congress, where they have been referred to
the judiciary committees of the Senate and House.
Unless prevented by affirmative action of Congress, which is
possible but very improbable, the rules will become effective three
months subsequent to adjournment of the present session of
Congress, but in no event prior to September 1, 1938. They will
*Of the Yakima Bar. Author: The Administration of Justice as Affected
by Insecurity of Tenure, 23 A. 3. A. J. 930 (Ross A. B. A. Award, 1937).
179 L. ed. 1720; 19 JouR. Am. Jun. Soc. 7 (June, 1935).
2"In some instances the practice is archaic and cumbersome, and
still enforces the technical intricacies and refinements that prevailed
in England in the 17th and 18th centuries, but have long been abandoned
in the land that gave them birth." REP. U. S. ATT'y GEN. (1937) 4.
3This is the correct designation as stated in Rule 85. They will be
referred to herein for brevity merely as the rules. The rules are
published in 82 L ed. Adv. Op. No. 8, Jan. 31, 1938; U. S. Law Week,
Jan. 4, 1938. (Copies of the rules (H. Doe. 460) may be secured from
the Superintendent of Public Documents, Washington, D. C., for 15a
a copy).
'All of the justices concurred except Justice Brandeis. The reasons
for his dissent were not published. Before his appointment he was
a member of the A. B. A. Shelton Committee sponsoring this improve-
ment.
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govern all proceedings in actions thereafter commenced, and also
further proceedings in actions then pending, "except to the extent
that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular
action pending when the rules take effect would. not be feasible
or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure
applies."'
The rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action."8 They govern the
procedure in the district courts of the United States, and also to
a considerable extent appellate procedure, in all suits of a civil
nature,7 both at law and in equity, including actions removed
from the state courts, except that they are not applicable to ad-
miralty, bankruptcy," eminent domain,9 and certain other special
proceedings. 0 The rules are not to be construed to extend or limit
jurisdiction or venue, nor to affect substantive rights, nor to impair
the constitutional right of jury trial1 1
It is impossible, without unduly extending the length of this
article, to discuss in detail each paragraph of the new rules, but
it is our purpose: (1) briefly to survey the historical background;
(2) to discuss the principal changes effected in federal procedure
through adoption of these rules, and the principal points of simi-
larity and difference between the new federal procedure and our
state procedure in Washington; and (3) to consider possible im-
provements in our state practice which might be adopted there-
from.
I.
Federal procedure at the present time is, of course, primarily
governed in law actions by the Conformity ActI2 of 1872 and
various other federal statutes and decisions, and in equity suits
by the federal equity rules adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1912 pursuant to act of Congress.1 8 The adoption
of these rules marks the successful culmination of the great move-
ment instituted by the American Bar Association a quarter cen-
tury ago in 1912, the same year in which the equity rules were
adopted. Until his death in 1930 Thomas W. Shelton of Virginia
'Rule 86.
GRule 1.
TSee also, Rules of Practice and Procedure After Plea of Guilt ty,
"Verdict or Finding of Guilt, in Criminal Cases, adopted by the U. S.
Supreme Court in 1934. 28 U. S. C. A. § 723a; 292 U. S. 661.
"'Except insofar as they may be made applicable thereto by rules
promulgated -by the Supreme Court."
'Except as to appeals.
1'Rules 1 and 81.
"Rule 82 and the Enabling Act.
"28 U. S. C. A. § 724.
-28 U. S. C. A. § 723.
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was the able chairman of the committee of that association which
diligently advocated the enactment by Congress of legislation
granting the Supreme Court the power to make such rules." At
first this was sought only as to law actions, but in 1922, under
the leadership of Chief Justice Taft, the movement was expanded
to cover this improvement as to both law and equity practice and
an elimination of the procedural distinctions between them. 5
Strange as it may seem, the principal opponent of this measure
for many years was the distinguished Senator Thomas J. Walsh
of Montana. It is an interesting paradox that the credit for
finally procuring this enactment by Congress is due to Attorney
General Homer S. Cummings, who was appointed to that office
in 1933 following the sudden death of his predecessor, Mr. Walsh.'6
The Act of June 19, 1934, pursuant to which these rules have
been adopted, covers both law and equity actions, and provides
as follows:
"Be it enacted . . . That the Supreme Court of the
United States shall have the power to prescribe, by gen-
eral rules, for the district courts of the United States and
for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice
and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant. They shall take effect six months
after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in con-
flict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
See. 2 The court may at any time unite the general
rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in
actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action and
procedure for both: Provided, however, That in such
union of rules the right of trial by jury as at common law
and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitu-
tution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. Such
united rules shall not take effect until they shall have been
reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the be-
ginning of a regular session thereof and until after the
close of such session."' 7
In 1935 the Supreme Court through Chief Justice Hughes made
124 A. B. A. J. 97 (Feb. 1938). See for example the able report of the
Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure. 53 A. B. A. REP. 138, 500
(1928).
1547 A. B. A. Rep 260 (1922). Chief Justice Hughes in the same
address hereinabove quoted also aid: "While such a division is readily
explained as a matter of historical development, it cannot be justified
as an objective in procedural reform." 79 L. ed. 1720.
"Clark, The rjhalZenge for a New Federal Ciil Procedure, 19 JouR.
Am. JuD. Soc. 10 (June, 1935).
"Act of June 19, 1934, c. 651, §§ 1, 2 (48 Stat. 1064), 28 U. S. C. A.,
§§ 729b, 723c.
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the welcome announcement that the new rules would have the
broader scope authorized by § 2 of the Act and would regulate
both law and equity procedure.' 8 The Court appointed a dis-
tinguished Advisory Committee of fourteen members, consisting
of five law school professors and nine eminent attorneys, including
former Attorney General William D. Mitchell of New York City
as chairman, and George Donworth of Seattle. 9 Dean Charles R.
Clark of Yale Law School, a recognized authority on pleading and
procedure, was appointed a member and the reporter for the com-
mittee. Subordinate advisory committees were appointed in each
state, including Mr. Albert's committee in Washington, which
rendered able assistance.
History has never seen a greater cooperative effort of the bench
and bar of a nation for the improvement of judicial procedure
than that which we have witnessed in this country during the past
three years.2 0  The Preliminary Draft of the proposed rules was
published by the Advisory Committee with the consent of the
Supreme Court in May, 1936. After interminable discussion and
countless suggestions from all parts of the nation a complete re.
vision of the rules was published in April, 1937, and the final
report of the Advisory Committee containing many further changes
was published in November, 1937. Some further revision was
made by the Supreme Court, although the rules as finally adopted
substantially follow those finally proposed by the Advisory Com-
mittee.
The Supreme Court in its order expressing appreciation for
the services of the Advisory Committee rightly refers to the task
as "the formulation of a system of rules designed to promote the
simplification of procedure in the federal courts, and thus to in-
crease the efficiency of the administration of justice.''2±
II.
There are two principal fundamental improvements effected by
the adoption of the new rules, each of which is both highly desir-
able and of far-reaching importance. 22  These are, of course, in
addition to the obvious recognition of the salutary principle that
rules of pleading and practice should be made by the courts and
not by statute. The first is the elimination of the distinction be-
tween the pleading and procedural systems of law and equity.
This distinction is purely historical in character. It was eliminated
,'295 U. S. 774.
20295 U. S. 774 (1935).
Tolman, 61 A. B. A. REP. 436 (1936); 23 A. B. A. J. 971 (Dec. 1937).
"24 A. B. A. J. 99 (Feb. 1938).
21Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of COivil Procedure, 22 A. B. A. T.
447 (July, 1936).
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as to state court procedure by the Field Code in New York in 1848
and thereafter in most of the other states, including Washington.23
A continuation of the distinction in federal procedure would be
wholly unjustifiable. Consequently rule 2 wisely provides that
hereafter "there shall be one form' of action to be known as 'civil
action'." "These rules now offer a single and uniform method
of procedure, free from arbitrary and artificial distinctions, which
have long been productive of delay, uncertainty and expense." 2"
The second fundamental change is the substitution of the princi-
ple of uniformity for that of conformity-the substitution of a
simple uniform system in all of the federal courts, alike in every
state, in law as well as equity actions, instead of the old so-called
Conformity Act of 1872. As is well known, the latter provided
that in law actions in the federal courts procedure should conform
"as near as may be" with the fluctuating procedural statutes of
the state in which the federal court is held.2 5 Although possessing
certain theoretical attractiveness, this act has not worked well in
practice. Every lawyer knows that by reason of other federal
statutes and decisions, federal procedure in law actions has been
far different from the state court procedure in numerous respects.
The Conformity Act experiment has been a complete failure.
"Fifty-odd notable exceptions to conformity have cre-
ated a new and distinct body of unrelated procedure
known as 'federal practice'. To the average lawyer it is
Sanskrit; to the experienced federal practitioner it is a
monopoly; to the author of text-books on federal practice
it is a golden harvest.'26
The principal argument of the opponents of this Enabling Act
through the years was that it would throw additional burden
upon the bar of learning two procedural systems, state and federal,
rather than merely one. Of course, not only was that a flimsy
excuse for obstructing such an improvement for the public good,
but in truth and in fact we did not have actual conformity under
the Conformity Act. Moreover-and this we wish to emphasize-
it is now readily apparent that in a state such as Washington
having a highly intelligent and advanced state court procedure,
there will be in fact greater conformity under the new rules than
under the old Conformity Act.
21REm. REV. STAT. §§ 153, 255.
".24 A. B. A. J. 132 (Feb. 1938).
=28 U. S. C. A. § 724. For an excellent discussion of the conformity
idea see Mr. Tolman's article, 23 A. B. A. J. 971 (Dec. 1937).
"Report of A. B. A. Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 53
A. B. A. REP. 500, 509 (1928). Compare Clark, The Proposed Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A. B. A. J. 447 (July, 1936) and 18 JoUR.
Am. Jui. Soc. 135 (Feb. 1935); Tolman, The Conformity Idea, 23 A. B.
A. J. 971 (Dec. 1937).
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The latter statement we believe will be evident as we proceed,
although the differences as well as the similarities between our state
procedure and the federal rules will be emphasized herein. Al-
though procedure under the new rules differs in several important
respects from the state court procedure in Washington, neverthe-
less in most respects there is a striking similarity between them-
and much more so than under the former federal procedure.2 7
Undoubtedly procedure in Washington, which was most ably rep-
resented on the Advisory Committee, was carefully studied by
that Committee and was substantially followed in many important
respects." It may be noted that the Advisory Committee an-
nounced that every feature of the new rules is in actual practice
in one or more states.2 9
In Washington, therefore, it is especially true that:
"The new uniform rules are a first step toward a real
and workable conformity. They are a composite of the
best features of state practice. In at least thirty states
the local practitioner can conduct litigation in federal
court under those rules without finding many substantial
departures from the method to which he is accustomed
in, the courts of his own state." 80
A third important feature of the new rules is the extreme
liberality as to joinder of parties and claims, as will be hereinafter
noted, to the end that the entire controversy may be adjudicated
in the one action.
The new federal rules are 86 in number and are divided into
eleven groups or chapters.8
Coming now to a consideration of their more important pro-
21"The one single system envisaged by the rules will not seem
greatly different from the procedure of most, if not all, of the states,
'but will appear as it is, merely the logical extension of already exisiting
state practice systems." Clark, The Proposed Federal Rifles of Civil
Procedure, 22 A. B. A. J. 447 (July, 1936).
2'This is shown by the rules as adopted and ,by the frequent citations
of the Wa'hington statutes and rules in the notes to the reports of the
Advisory Committee.
"24 A. B. A. J. 98 (Feb. 1938); 61 A. B. A. REP. 423, (1936).
2024 A. B. A. J. 132 (Feb. 1938).
nFor excellent discussions of the proposed rules by members of the
Advisory Committee and others before the 1936 and 1937 American Bar
Association conventions, see: 61 A. B. A. REP. 86 to 119, 423 to 496 (1936);
22A.B.A.J.780etseq. (Nov.1936); 23A.B.A.J. 965 to 978 (Dec. 1937).
See also, Hammond, Some Changes in the Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 A. B. A. J. 629 (Aug. 1987);
Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A. B. A. J.
447 (July, 1936); Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-
the Background, 44 YAm L. J. 387, 1291 (1935).
For a complete bibliography of this general subject see 62 A. B. A.
REP. 705 (1937), and also pages 91 to 95 of the Notes to the Rules of
Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, just pub-
lished (March, 1938) under the direction of the Advisory Committee.
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visions, among the more obvious highly desirable improvements is
the abolition of the technicalities pertaining to terms of court, the
powers of the court being no longer affected by the expiration of
a term of court.82 Also eliminated is the absurd necessity of
taking exceptions to adverse rulings of the court during a trial
(save as to instructions to juries) in order to have the right to
predicate error thereon in the event of an appeal.3 3
Commencement of Actions
As to the method of commencing an action, the rules adhere to
the present federal practice and differ substantially from our
state court procedure. Rule 3 provides that "a civil action is
commenced by filing a complaint with the court."'" The clerk
then forthwith issues the summons and delivers it for service to
the marshal or person specially appointed for that purpose. With
it is served copy of the complaint furnished by the plaintiff. All
process other than subpoenas may be served anywhere within the
state in which the court is held, and "when a statute of the United
States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state."
(Rule 4).
The preliminary draft by the Advisory Committee submitted
alternative rules in this respect, and there was a direct conflict
of opinion among the committee members. It is believed that it
would have been much preferable if our more informal state
practice had been adhered to, but this rule was finally adopted
by the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court in response
to an overwhelming reaction from the legal profession throughout
the country in favor of the more formal method.85
The next rule, on the other hand, is very informal in providing
that service of pleadings subsequent to the original complaint,
motions, etc., upon an attorney may be made by delivering a
copy to him or leaving the same at his office with his clerk or
other person in charge thereof, "or by mailing it to him at his
last known address.... Service by mail is complete upon mailing."
(Rule 5(b) ).I
In any action in which there are unusually large numbers of
"Rules 6 (c) and 77.
"Rule 46. Compare REm. REv. STAT. §§ 382, 385.
3'In view of this provision undoubtedly the period of the statute of
limitations is to be determined as of the date of filing the complaint, as
under our state practice. REM. REv. STAT. § 167; 23 A. B. A. J. 967 (Dec.
1937).
"23 A. . A.- J. 967 (Dec. 1937); Hammond, Some Changes in the
Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 23
A. B. A. J. 629 (Aug. 1937); Report Advisory Committee p. 5 (April,
1937).
"In cases where opposing counsel reside in the same city or town
this is very informal, but undoubtedly convenient.
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defendants, the court may by order dispense with service of the
pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto as between the
defendants; any cross-claim or affirmative defense being deemed
denied or avoided; provided the same is filed and served upon
the plaintiff and a copy of such order is served upon all parties
as directed by the court.
3 7
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a
party are to be filed with the clerk of the court either before
service or within a reasonable time thereafter. (Rule 5(d)).
Notice of hearing of motions must be served at least five days
in advance.3 8 In the event of service by mail three days must be
added to the prescribed period, making a total of eight days.
(Rule 6(d) and (e)).
Pleadings and Motions
The rules differ from the Washington state practice in another
important respect in that, as under federal equity rule 31, unless
ordered by the court, there is a reply only if the answer contains
a counterclaim denominated as such. (Rule 7). Allegations by
way of affirmative defense are deemed denied or avoided without
reply. (Rule 8(d)).
In this respect we believe that the Washington state procedure
under the code is much superior. As well stated by Judge Fee
of Oregon, there is danger of "out-liberaling the liberals."189 There
is danger of a litigant and his counsel being surprised at the trial
as to the issues presented, which is not always conducive to justice,
especially from the standpoint of the "surprisee."4 0
A complaint or other pleading setting forth a claim for relief
must contain:
"(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon
which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new
grounds of jurisdiction to supliort it. (2) a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the
relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the
alternative, or of several different types may be de-
manded." 41
"Rule 5 (c). In certain actions such as lion or (water right cases
such a practice is decidedly convenient.Z"Unless otherwise ordered by the court, which may be done ew parte
for cause shown.
"61 A. B. A. REP. 93 (1936). The rule as then proposed was later
substantially modified.
"For example, if an answer affirmatively pleads a release, certainly
the defendant is entitled to know before the trial upon what ground,
if any, the plaintiff contends that the release is not binding.
"Rule 8 (a). As to pleading in the alternative, compare Church
v. Brown, 150 Wash. 178, 272 Pac. 511 (1928).
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It will be noted that the second requirement pertains to a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief", rather than "statement of the facts", as
required by the code of procedure in Washington and other
states.4 2 Attached to the rules is an "Appendix of Forms" pre-
pared by the Advisory Committee as part of its final report and
adopted by the Supreme Court.48
Rule 84 states that the same "are intended to indicate, subject
to the provisions of these rules, the simplicity and brevity of
statement which the rules contemplate." '4 4
Most of the proposed forms are exceedingly short and general
in their allegations. 45 This is undoubtedly very desirable, so long
as it is not carried too far. We believe a word of warning should
be expressed, however, as it is easy for counsel to be misled by
these proposed forms. It is believed that they are suggested as
covering an exceedingly simple factual situation and that, as is
true in most cases, where the facts are more involved, the same
should be pleaded at greater length and with greater particularity.
In order that the defendant and his counsel may be fairly apprised
before the trial precisely what he is charged with, certainly more
should be required than a mere statement in vague general terms
of the nature of the action and the amount sued for. Here again
there is danger of "out-liberaling the liberals."
That this is the proper construction of the rules and that which
will be applied by the federal courts is, we believe, indicated by
rule 12(e) which provides:
"A party may move for a more definite statement or
for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred
with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him
properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare
for trial. The motion shall point out the defects com-
plained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted
and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the
"2REm. REV. STAT. § 258; Equity Rule 25. This departure from the
provision of the state code was intentional on the part of the Advisory
Committee. See Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22
A. B. A. J. 447, 450 (July, 1936).
"This final report was presented in November, 1937, and there was
no opportunity for public criticism as to the appendix of forms therein
contained.
"The Advisory Committee appended a note thereto in their final
report changing the language of that rule and stating thaf the same
"is to make it clear that the rules control the forms and that the forms
do not supersede the rules." Final Report of Advisory Committee p. 56(Nov. 1937). The former provision was that the said forms "shall be
considered sufficient under these rules." Report of Advisory Committee
p. 215 (April, 1937).
'"For examples of the complaint see forms 3 to 17 inclusive.
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court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which
the motion was directed or make such order as it deems
just. A bill of particulars becomes a part of the pleading
which it supplements."4 6
In other words, construing rules 8(a) and 12(e) together, in
order to give effect to each, in accordance with well established
rules of construction, it seems clear that the "short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief" must also, in order to survive attack by motion, state the
facts "with sufficient definiteness and particularity to enable
him (the adverse party) properly to prepare his responsive plead.
ing or (and) to prepare for trial."
With reference to defenses rule 8(b) requires that "a party
shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim
asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the
adverse party relies." Denials may be for want of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an aver-
ment, and this has the effect of a denial.
Rule 8(c) lists a considerable number of affirmative defenses,47
and provides that the answer should affirmatively plead any of
them "and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirma-
tive defense." Failure to deny constitutes an admission, except
as to the amount of damages, and except where no responsive
pleading is required or permitted. (Rule 8(d)).
The rules contain these commendable provisions:
"Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise,
and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions
are required." (Rule 8(e) (1)).
"All pleadings shall be so construed as to do sub-
stantial justice." (Rule 8(f)).
Rule 8(e) (2) permits pleading "two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one
count or defense or in separate counts or defenses." The pleading
is not rendered insufficient so long as one of the statements in the
alternative if made independently would be sufficient, even though
others are insufficient. "A party may also state as many separate
claims or defenses as he has, regardless of consistency,48 and
whether based on legal or equitable grounds or on both."''4
"In Washington a -bill of particulars is not part of the pleadings.
Dudley v. Duval, 29 Wash. 528, 70 Pac. 68 (1902); Nilsen v. Ebey Land
Co., 90 Wash. 295, 155 Pac. 1036 (1916).
"One of these is "Injury by fellow servant." Evidently the Supreme
Court of the United States still recognizes the existence of the fellow
servant rule. But see Buss v. Wachsmith, 190 Wash. 673, 70 P. (2d) 417,
adhered to en banc, 93 Wash. Dec. 201 (1937).
"This is contrary to the rule In Washington. Seattle National Bank
v. Carter, 13 Wash. 281, 43 Pac. 331 (1895).
"Compare hEM. R v. STAT. § 273.
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Except to the extent required to show the court's jurisdiction,
it is unnecessary to allege the capacity of a party to sue or he
sued, or authority to sue or be sued in a representative capacity,
or the legal existence of an organized association of persons. If
there is any issue thereon, it must be raised by specific negative
averments of the adverse party. (Rule 9.) It is further provided
that in all averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances shall
be stated with particularity, although malice, intent, knowledge
and other condition of mind may be averred generally. It is also
sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have
been performed; and if this is denied the same must be denied
specifically and with particularity.50 Items of special damage
must be specifically stated.
Rule 11 abolishes the absurd rule in equity that the averments
of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of
two witnesses, or of one witness sustained by corroborating cir-
cumstances. The new rules adhere to the practice under equity
rule 24, rather than the state practice, in eliminating verification
of pleadings and substituting therefor the requirement that every
pleading shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name.51 Such signature constitutes a certificate by the
attorney that he has read the pleading, that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support
it, and that it is not interposed for delay. For a willful violation
of this rule an attorney "may be subjected to appropriate dis-
ciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or
indecent matter is inserted."'2
The period for appearing after service of summons and com-
plaint within the state continues to be twenty days, except as to
the United States or an officer or agency thereof, as to whom it
is sixty days. (Rule 12(a)).
Demurrers are abolished, and there is substituted therefor a
motion to dismiss, as under the equity rules.55 The suggested
language in form 19 appended to the rules is:
"The defendant moves the court to dismiss the action
because the complaint fails to state a claim against de-
fendant upon which relief can be granted."
.Rule 9. Compare REm. Rzv. STAT. § 288.
"Or by the party if not represented by counsel.
"While opinions may differ, twe submit that while placing such re-
sponsibility upon the attorney may not be particularly objectionable,
there is much more reason for placing responsibility upon the party
who knows the facts, by retaining the requirement of verification of
pleadings.
"Rules 7 (c) and 12 (b); form 19. Compare equity rule 29.
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A similar allegation may be made as an affirmative defense in
an answer. (Form 20).
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if
one is required, "except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person,
(3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency
of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. A motion making any of these defenses shall be
made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No de-
fense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more
other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion.
If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may assert
at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief."
(Rule 12(b)).
After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the plead-
ings. (Rule 12(c)). This is apparently an appropriate method
for testing the sufficiency of the allegations of an affirmative
defense in an answer."
Defenses upon any of the six grounds referred to in rule 12(b)
hereinabove quoted, whether made in a pleading or by motion,
and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, must be heard and
determined before trial on application of any party, unless other-
wise ordered by the court. (Rule 12(d)).
The rules also permit motions for a more definite statement or
for a bill of particulars, hereinabove referred to, and motions to
strike. (Rules 12(e) and (f)). As under the state practice, all
defenses are waived which are not presented either by motion or
by answer or reply except (1) failure to state a claim or defense,
and (2) lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. (Rule 12(h)).
Repleading in an action removed from the state court is un-
necessary unless the court so orders. In such action if the de-
fendant has not answered, he must answer or present available
defenses or objections within the time allowed for answer by the
state law or within five days after the filing of the transcript of
the record in federal court, whichever period is longer. (Rule
81(c)).
Z'While it is difficult to see any advantage in abolishing demurrers,
nevertheless the same result may be reached under the new rules under
another name. Fortunately the new rules do not adopt the absurd doc-
trine followed in this state as to motions for judgment on the pleadings.
See State v. Vinther, 183 Wash. 350, 48 P. (2d) 915, 186 Wash. 691, 58
P. (2d) 357 (1935).
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Counterclaims are of two kinds, compulsory and permissive. A
pleading must state as a counterclaim "any claim, not the subject
of a pending action, which at the time of filing the pleading the
pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction."
(Rule 13(a)).
A pleading may state as a counterclaim "any claim against an
opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." (Rule
13 (b)).
A counterclaim may claim relief "exceeding in amount or dif-
ferent in kind" from that sought by the adversary, and it may
or may not diminish or defeat a recovery sought by the latter.
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A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim that
the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the
cross-claimant for all or part-of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross-claimant. (Rule 13(g)).
When the presence of additional parties within the jurisdiction
is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination
of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them brought
in, if possible without depriving the court of jurisdiction."
Rule 14 introduces a new third-party practice. 7 Before the
service of his answer a defendant may move ez parte, or after
service of the answer, on notice to the plaintiff, for relief as a
third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a
person not a party to the action, who is or may be liable to him
or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him. If the motion is granted, such additional party so served is
called a third-party defendant and may assert his defenses against
the plaintiff, the third-party plaintiff (original defendant), or
any other party. The third-party defendant is bound by the
adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff,
as well as of his own liability to the plaintiff or to the third-party
,Rule 13 (c). These provisions are not applicable as against the
United States or an officer or agency thereof.
"Rule 13 (h). Compare REm. REV. STAT. § 308-2.
"'See form 22; Notes to Rules of Civil Procedure, p. 17 (March, 1938);
Report of Advisory Committee, p. 41 (April, 1937).
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plaintiff. A third-party defendant may proceed likewise by
adding a new third-party defendant."8
With reference to amendments, the rules are extremely liberal.
As under our state practice, a party may amend his pleadings
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading
is served, otherwise only by leave of court or by written consent
of the adverse party. 9 Such "leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires." If the pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted, and the action has not been placed upon
the trial calendar, it may be amended without leave of court at
any time within twenty days after it is served.
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried "by express
or implied consent of the parties", they are to be treated in all
respects as raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the plead-
ings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion at any time,
even after judgment. Failure so to amend, however, does not affect
the result of the trial of such issues. If evidence is objected to
at the trial as not within the issues, the court may permit amend-
ments, and "shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits." A continuance may be granted to enable the other party
to meet such evidence. The court may permit a supplemental
pleading setting forth the occurrences since the original pleading.
(Rule 15(b) (c) and (d)).
Rule 16 provides for pre-trial procedure in the discretion of
the court-an interesting experiment which is advocated by num-
erous authorities on procedure and which has been found quite
successful in England and several larger cities with congested
trial calendars, notably Detroit and Boston. The court may, in
its discretion, direct all attorneys to appear before it for a con-
ference to consider: simplification of the issues, amendments to
the pleadings, possibility of obtaining admissions, limitation of
number of expert witnesses, advisibility of preliminary reference
to a master for findings to be used as evidence before the jury,
and all other matters which might expedite disposition of the case.
The court makes an order as to the action taken at the conference,
thereby limiting the issues to be disposed of at the trial. Such
order controls the subsequent course of the action, "unless modi-
"At this point one may have doubts about the simplification of pro-
cedure, but In practice it is not likely that it would ,be as confusing as
it sounds.
"Rule 15 (a). Compare P-m REV. STAT. § 308-3.
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fled at the trial to prevent manifest injustice." Pre-trial hearings
may be ordered in special cases or in the discretion of the court
by general order establishing a pre-trial calendar as to all actions,
jury actions, or non-jury actions6 0
Parties
Rule 17 contains provisions as to parties substantially the same
as under our state code. Every action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest, subject to the usual excep-
tions.61
The plaintiff in his complaint or in "a reply setting forth a
counterclaim" and the defendant in an answer containing a coun-
terclaim, "may join, either as independent or as alternate claims,
as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have."
Subject to the requirements of certain other rules, there may be
a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties and a like
joinder of cross-claims or third-party claims.62
Another excellent provision, conducive to avoiding a multiplicity
of suits and to determination of an entire controversy, is that,
without altering the substantive rights of the parties, two claims
may be joined in a single action which formerly could be prose-
cuted only consecutively."' In particular, a plaintiff may state
a claim for money and a claim to have set aside a fraudulent con-
veyance, without first obtaining a judgment establishing the
money claim.4
Persons having a joint interest must be made parties if subject
to the jurisdiction of the court and if possible without depriving
O'For excellent discussions of this subject see, Notes to Rules of
Civil Procedure p. 16 (March, 1938); Report of Advisory Committee p.
45 (April, 1937); Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial
Procedure, 36 MicH. L. REV. 215 (Dec. 1937); 21 Jouu. Am. Jun. Soc, 125
(Dec. 1937). See also Success of Pre-Trial Hearings Demonstrated, 21
JouR. Am. JuD. Soc. 160 (Feb. 1938); McDermott, Just What Is Your
Defense, 18 JOUR. Am. JuD. Soc. 100 (1935); Mitchell, Some Problems
Confronting the Advisory Committee, 23 A. B. A. J. 969 (Dec. 1937).
"Compare RE-. REv. STAT. §§ 179 et seq. and equity rule 37.
"Rule 18. For an excellent statement by Dean Clark as to the de-
sirability of this liberality as to joinder of claims and parties see
Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A. B. A. J.
447, 449 (July, 1936) and also 23 A. B. A. J. 976 (Dec. 1937) where he
states that "this has been the universal trend of Anglo-Saxon procedural
reform." See also Notes to Rules of Civil Procedure p. 19 (March, 1938),
and Report of Advisory Committee p. 50 (April, 1937).
"Rule 18 (b). "This rule is inserted to make it clear that in a single
action a party should be accorded all the relief to which he is entitled
regardless of whether it is legal .or equitable or both. This necessarily
includes a deficiency judgment in foreclosure actions formerly provided
for in equity rule 10." Notes to Rules of Civil Procedure p. 19.
"Rule 18 (b). This rule conforms to the provisions of The Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §§ 9 and 10. Notes to Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure p. 19. Our state practice is to the contrary. O'Day v. Ambaum,
47 Wash, 684, 92 Pac. 421, (1907); Allen v. Kane, 79 Wash. 248, 140
Pac. 534 (1914).
THE NEW FEDERAL RULES
the court of jurisdiction. Subject to the same conditions, the
court shall order added as parties those who are not indispensable,
but who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded
between those already parties.65
The rule as to permissive joinder of parties is substantially the
same as in this state.6 All persons may join in one action as
plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in
the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the
action. (Rule 20(a)). A like rule applies to joinder of defend-
ants. It is unnecessary that a plaintiff or defendant be interested
in obtaining or defending against all of the relief demanded.
Judgment may be given for or against one or more parties ac-
cording to their respective rights or liabilities. The court may
order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or
prejudice.
Parties may be drppped or added by order of the court at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just.67 Misjoinder of
parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Anjy claim
against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
Interpleader proceedings are authorized, where the defendants'
claims are such that the plaintiff may be exposed to double or
multiple liability. It is no defense that their claims are adverse
to and independent of one another, without a common origin, or
that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to
any or all of the claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liabil-
ity may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim or counter-
claim. 8
Class actions affecting numerous persons may under certain
circumstances be brought or defended by one or more persons on
behalf of all.66  Where a corporation refuses to sue and suit is
brought by a stockholder the complaint must be verified and must
contain certain allegations showing that the suit is not collusive
to confer jurisdiction on a federal court. A class action cannot
"Rule 19. See form 26. Compare REm. REv. STAT. §§ 189, 196, 308-2.
See also Notes to Rules of Civil Procedure p. 20 (March, 1938); Report
of Advisory Committee p. 54 (April, 1937).
"Rule 20. Compare REM. Rsv. STAT. § 308-2.
"Rule 21. Compare REm. REv. STAT. § 308-2.
"Rule 22. See forms 18 and 21. Compare REY_ REv. STAT. §§ 198
to 201. See Notes to Rules of Civil Procedure p. 21 (March, 1938) and
Report of Advisory Committee p. 55 (April, 1937).
"Rule 23. Compare R m. REv. STAT. § 190 and equity rule 38. See
Notes to Rules of Civil Procedure p. 22 (March, 1938) and Report of
Advisory Committee p. 58 (April, 1937).
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be dismissed or compromised without the court's approval, and in
certain cases, only after notice to all members of the class.
Intervention may be made as a matter of right when uncondi-
tionally authorized by federal statute, or when the representation
of the intervenor's interest may be inadequate and he may be
bound by the judgment, or when he may be adversely affected by
disposition of property in the custody of the court. Moreover in
the discretion of the court anyone may be permitted to intervene
when his claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common.7 0
(To be continued)
"Rule 24. Compare REm. REV. STAT. §§ 202, 203, 308-2. See form
23 and Notes to Rules of Civil Procedure p. 24 (March, 1938); Report
of Advisory Committee p. 62 (April, 1937).
